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The Rejection of Constitutional Incrementalism in Nepal’s Federalisation 
 
Mara Malagodi* 
 
Abstract 
The relationship between federalism and identity was the single most contentious 
issue in the drafting of Nepal’s 2015 Constitution, and remains an embattled 
feature of the country’s post-conflict constitutional settlement. This article 
explains why ‘constitutional incrementalism’ – the innovative constitution-
making strategy for deeply divided societies theorised by Hanna Lerner – was 
ultimately (and wisely) rejected in Nepal’s federalisation process. Historically a 
unitary state since its creation in the late eighteenth century, Nepal committed 
itself to federal restructuring in 2007, but profound disagreements endured over 
the set of institutional choices concerning the features of Nepal’s federal 
arrangements throughout the country’s latest constitution-making process (2008-
15). Constitutional incrementalism with its emphasis on deferral, ambiguity and 
contradiction was thought of in some quarters as a pragmatic and instrumental 
way out of Nepal’s political impasse. In the end, the 2015 Constitution expressly 
named the Provinces (even if by just using numbers) and demarcated their 
boundaries already at the time of its promulgation. Any changes to this 
framework can only take place now by way of constitutional amendment. This 
article explains why the incrementalist approach was rejected in Nepal’s 
federalisation process, and reflects on the conditions under which constitutional 
incrementalism may succeed in societies that present profound disagreements 
over the collective identity of the polity. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The present article aims to explain the reasons why the ‘incrementalist’ approach to 
constitution making was rejected in Nepal’s contentious process of federalisation 
during the post-conflict drafting of the current 2015 Constitution (2008-15), and to 
distil key comparative lessons from this case study. An incremental strategy would 
have favoured gradualism with respect to foundational issues – that is, deferring the 
making of key decisions, and employing linguistic ambiguity and contradictory 
provisions in constitutional texts.1 Constitution makers in deeply divided societies 
sometimes opt for open-ended design choices that allow greater constitutional leeway 
to future generations without being bound by past decisions. Particularly in post-                                                        
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1 Hanna Lerner, Making Constitutions in Deeply Divided Societies (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 
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conflict societies it is difficult to reach agreements on the most contentious issues and 
speak constitutionally in one voice. As such, constitutional incrementalism may offer 
a pragmatic and instrumental way out of political impasse. Ultimately this was not the 
case in Nepal’s process of federalisation. 
To clarify, the term ‘federalisation’ designates the set of institutional choices 
concerning the features of Nepal’s federal arrangements made at the time of 
constitution making. The ongoing post-2017 administrative process of federal 
restructuring understood as the setting up of the institutions of government at 
provincial level after the promulgation of the Constitution, instead, is outside the 
scope of this article. As for the expression ‘constitutional incrementalism’, this was 
coined by Hanna Lerner to describe a particular type of constitution-making strategy 
deployed in deeply divided societies. Lerner’s seminal contribution was first 
articulated in a 2010 article,2 then in book form through a more in-depth comparison 
of the constitution-making experiences of India (1947-50), Ireland (1922), and Israel 
(1948-50). 3  Lerner argues that the incrementalist strategy allows societies with 
profound disagreements over the identity of the polity and the nature of the state to 
succeed in crafting a constitution (or function under an informal one) in the short 
term, and to promote political stability and democracy in the long term. The present 
article aims to apply Lerner’s framework to Nepal’s experience of federalisation 
during the country’s post-conflict constitution-making process, and test the viability 
of constitutional incrementalism in this context. 
The key argument advanced in this article is that constitutional incrementalism was 
not a strategy that suited Nepal’s political context and historical circumstances with 
regard to federalisation during the drafting of the new constitution. As such, its 
rejection was a positive outcome that ultimately prevented further conflict and 
fostered political stability in the country. Conversely, the partial deployment of 
incrementalist strategies in the drafting of the declaratory parts of the new constitution 
represents a step back from the inclusionary strides in the previous Interim 
Constitution and contributed to exacerbating existing political tensions and 
disaffection on the part of historically marginalised groups.                                                          
2  Hanna Lerner,  ‘Constitution-writing in deeply divided societies’ (2010) 16:1 Nations and 
Nationalism, 68-88  
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Disagreements over the identity of the polity have been at the heart of Nepal’s post-
conflict constitutional experience. The drafting of the country’s new, permanent 
constitution through the work of two Constituent Assemblies (‘CAs’, held 2008-12 
and 2013-15) has been central to the peace process (2006-15) after the ten-year-long 
civil war between the Maoist insurgents and the government (1996-2006). In 1996, 
the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) launched a ‘People’s War’ to capture the 
Nepali state with a view of initiating a radical program of state restructuring. The 
demand for a new, inclusive constitution drafted by representatives directly elected by 
the people was pivotal to the Maoists’ political project and became the precondition 
for peace.4 The Maoist insurgency also brought the question of federalisation on the 
basis of identity at the forefront of the country’s constitutional debates. 
Federal debates in Nepal date back to the early 1950s, but remained marginal until the 
beginning of the peace process. In fact, Nepal has been a unitary state since its 
creation in the late 18th century. In 1996, however, the Maoists advanced the demand 
for territorial autonomy on the basis of ethnicity as part of their state-restructuring 
scheme, linking radical constitutional change to identity politics for the first time in 
the country’s history. The People’s War was not an ethnic conflict per se because the 
main driver of the insurgency was the politics of class; but the war also featured 
conspicuous demands for recognition of the many historically marginalised groups in 
the country.5 Nepal’s staggering socio-cultural diversity is illustrated by the 2011 
Census data.6 However, no single ethno-linguistic group constitutes a majority, and 
most groups are intermingled and territorially dispersed.  
                                                        
4 Michael Hutt (ed), Himalayan People’s War: Nepal’s Maoist Rebellion (Hurst & Company 2004) 
285-87. 
5 Sara Shneiderman, Luke Wagner, Jacob Rinck, Amy Johnson, and Austin Lord, ‘Nepal’s Ongoing 
Political Transformation: A review of post-2006 literature on conflict, the state, identities, and 
environments’ (2016) 50:6 Modern Asian Studies, 2041-2114. 
6 Hinduism is the religion of 81% of the population. Nepali remains the lingua franca of the majority of 
the population, but only 44.6% named it as their mother tongue, alongside 122 other mother tongues. 
Of the country’s 125 caste and ethnic groups, only the largest six account for more than 5% of the total 
population. The two biggest groups are the Chetri (i.e. Kshatriyas of local Khas origins) who make up 
16.6% of the population and the Bahun (i.e. Pahari or hill Brahmins) who make up another 12.2%. 
Together, these two high-caste Hindu groups constitute the Parbatiya group (28.8%) to which Nepal’s 
royal family and most of the elites belong. In terms of historically marginalized groups, dalits (i.e. 
‘former untouchables’) form about 14% of Nepal’s population. The 63 groups classified under the 
umbrella term Adivasi Janajati (i.e. ‘indigenous people’), who can be described as ethno-linguistic 
groups that do not use Nepali as their mother tongue, account for 36% of the total population. Madhesi 
groups (i.e. non-Pahari ‘Terai plain dwellers’, often erroneously described as ‘of Indian origins’) 
constitute slightly less than 20% of the population.  
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Nepal has witnessed a steady politicisation of identity since 1990 – with a sharp 
increase during the civil war.7 Throughout the peace process the demand for identity-
based federalisation became a key component of the Maoist agenda – alongside those 
of Madhesi and Janajati groups that operated both outside and within the mainstream 
political parties. As such, political actors advocating for identity-based federalism 
believed this kind of territorial restructuring would break the dominant groups’ hold 
on power. Conversely, the leadership of the mainstream political parties initially 
resisted demands for federalism tout court. Then, by 2007, when federalisation 
became politically inevitable, its detractors ostensibly opposed only identity-based 
federalism, not federalism per se. 
The ‘federal question’ proved to be the single most contentious issue in the drafting of 
Nepal’s new constitution. Disagreements over federalisation were so severe that they 
risked derailing the entire post-conflict constitution-making process. Thus, 
constitutional incrementalism was seen in some quarters as a viable strategy to 
overcome the impasse. India’s successful experience with the linguistic reorganisation 
of the States, which entailed changing the names and boundaries of the federal units 
after the promulgation of the constitution, was hailed as a good example for Nepal to 
follow. Eventually, the inability to find an agreement on the modalities of 
federalisation led to the collapse of the first Constituent Assembly in 2012 after a 
botched attempt at postponing it. Federalism remained the main stumbling block also 
for the second Constituent Assembly. It was only after the devastating earthquakes in 
the spring of 2015 that the leaders of the main political parties agreed to ‘fast-track’ 
the drafting of the constitution. They again attempted to sideline the question of 
federalisation by keeping the constitution silent on the names and demarcation of the 
federal units and making provisions for the Provincial Assemblies to determine them 
at a later stage. However, it again proved impossible to transfer the most controversial 
decisions about federalism from the constitutional to the political arena. In the end, 
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2014),<http://cbs.gov.np/image/data/Population/Population%20Monograph%20of%20Nepal%202014/
Population%20Monograph%20V02.pdf>. 
7 Alpa Shah and Feyzi Ismail, ‘Class Struggle, the Maoists, and the Indigenous Question in Nepal and 
India’ (2015) 50:35 Economic and Political Weekly. 
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the 2015 Constitution expressly named the Provinces (even if by just using numbers) 
and demarcated their boundaries already at the time of its promulgation. 
The analysis of the Nepali case study contributes to debates in the field of 
comparative constitutional law by drawing a set of Nepal-specific conclusions and by 
distilling more generalisable comparative lessons about constitutional incrementalism. 
Nepal’s process of federalisation is analysed in light of the recent debates on 
incrementalism 8  with two aims in mind: first, to explain specifically why the 
incrementalist approach was rejected in matters of federalisation during Nepal’s most 
recent constitution-making process; second, to reflect more broadly on the conditions 
under which constitutional incrementalism may succeed in societies that present 
profound disagreements over the collective identity of the polity.  
 
2. Political Actors, Territorial Demands, and Federalisation in Nepal 
The modality in which federal demands have emerged and have been articulated in 
Nepal explain both the inextricable link between federalisation and identity politics in 
the country, and the widespread resistance to federalism from a vast array of political 
actors. Nepal’s political context is crucial to understand the rejection constitutional 
incrementalism in matters of federalisation. Thus, this section provides a mapping of 
Nepal’s political forces in historical perspective and classifies them into two 
categories: ‘adamant’ pro-identity federalists and ‘reluctant’ pro-capability federalists. 
Then, it offers an overview of Nepal’s federalisation process to signpost the crucial 
developments in Nepal’s embattled constitutional saga. 
 
2.1. ‘Adamant’ v ‘Reluctant’ Federalists: Identity and Capability-Based Federalism 
Nepal was never colonised. Moreover, the Shah Hindu monarchy with its dynastic 
continuity (1769-2008) remained Nepal’s key political institution for over two                                                         
8 Rosalind Dixon and Tom Ginsburg, ‘Deciding not to decide: Deferral in constitutional design’ 9:3 
International Journal of Constitutional Law, 636-672; Rohan Edrisinha, ‘Challenges of Post Peace 
Agreement Constitution Making: Some Lessons from Nepal’ (2017) 9:3 Journal of Human Rights 
Practice, 436-446; Asanga Welikala, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Incrementalism’ (2017) CPA 
Working Papers on Constitutional Reform, N. 14. 
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centuries. As such, the ideological narratives fostering the legitimacy of political 
authority in the country gave rise to an autochthonous form of constitutionalism. 
Hinduism, the Shah monarchy, and the Nepali language became the main ideological 
coordinates upon which a state-framed creation of the Nepali nation took place. 
Conversely, these narratives have also determined specific patterns of marginalisation 
and exclusion of the many caste, ethno-linguistic, regional, and religious groups in the 
country.9 The roots of this process can be found as early as in the late 18th century; 
however, it became full-fledged only in the 1960s during the Panchayat monarchical 
autocracy (1960-1990). 10 ‘Unity in diversity’ in the Nepali context came to mean a 
hierarchical ordering of society constructed around the values and ideological 
coordinates of the dominant upper caste pahari Hindus (Parbatiya, now Khas-Arya), 
and underpinned by a highly centralised Hindu monarchical form of state.11  
Nepal has always been a unitary state, whose administrative structure up until the 
elections of 2017 reflected the Panchayat arrangements introduced in 1961. The 
organisation of the Nepali state featured no recognition of sociocultural diversity in 
territorial form. The local Panchayat administration was territorially organised along 
two levels: second-tier local government bodies (with 75 Districts, jilla, 3,995 Village 
Development Committees, gaum, and 36 Municipalities, nagar); and first-tier local 
government bodies, (with 5 Development Regions, kshetra and 14 Zones, anchal). 
Significantly, the functions of the first-tier bodies remained unclear.12  
The re-democratisation of 1990 opened the political space to the voices of Nepal’s 
many groups marginalised on the basis of class and identity (gender, caste, religion, 
ethnicity, language, region, sexual orientation, etc). While a popular movement had 
succeeded in putting an end to the Panchayat regime and restoring multiparty 
democracy under a constitutional monarchy, forms of constitutional nationalism and 
                                                        
9 Mara Malagodi, Constitutional Nationalism and Legal Exclusion: Equality, Identity Politics, and 
Democracy in Nepal (Oxford University Press 2013). 
10  Pratyoush Onta, ‘Ambivalence Denied: the Making of Rastriya Itihas in Panchayat Era 
Textbooks’ (1996) 23:1 Contributions to Nepalese Studies, 213-254. 
11 András Höfer, The Caste Hierarchy and the State in Nepal: A Study of the Muluki Ain of 1854 
(Universitatsverlag Wagner 1979). 
12 Susanne Hesselbarth, ‘Alignment Strategies in The Field of Decentralisation and Local Governance, 
Country Study of Practices And Experiences: Nepal’ Development Partners Working Group on Local 
Governance and Decentralization International Development Partner Harmonisation for Enhanced Aid 
Effectiveness, <http://www.delog.org/cms/upload/pdf/wg/CountryStudy_Nepal_Oct2007.pdf> 
(October 2007). 
 7 
legal exclusion persisted.13 Growing demands for social inclusion, however, mostly 
consisted of moderate, systemic demands for institutional reform. Thus, in 1996, the 
government commissioned a report on decentralisation and local self-governance, and 
created a task force to improve the situation of marginalised groups.  
The government committed to decentralisation and devolution by enacting the Local 
Self-Governance Act in 1999. 14  Significantly, the Act prescribed the mandatory 
allocation of 20% of seats at the Village level to women,15 and provisions for the 
nomination of women and marginalised groups in the executive committees at 
Village16 and District level.17 However, the innovations introduced by the 1999 Act 
remained mostly ineffective as no local elections were held for twenty years (1997-
2017). A modicum of recognition along identity lines was also introduced by the 
National Foundation for the Development of Indigenous Nationalities (NFDIN) Act 
in 2002, which was intended to increase the participation of Janajati in state 
institutions. However, the NFDIN Act only recognised 59 groups as ‘indigenous 
nationalities’,18 while the 2001 Census had identified over 100 caste/ethnic groups. 
These groups had previously united in 1990 under NEFIN (Nepal Federation of 
Indigenous Nationalities), and put forward civic demands for recognition and 
inclusion through affirmative action, with a very limited territorial dimension. 
Nepali governments have been historically most preoccupied with politics in the Terai 
– the long lowland area running along the open border with India, whose population is 
to a great degree composed of Madhesi. One of the most contentious issues in the 
Terai throughout the 1990s has been the question of citizenship, with estimates that in 
1994 about 3.5 million people did not have citizenship certificates. According to an 
ICG report, this was caused by the legal requirements of descent and knowledge of 
Nepali for naturalization, discriminatory linguistic policies by the state, under-
representation in state institutions, and economic discrimination. 19  The 1990 
Constitution featured clearly discriminatory and exclusionary citizenship clauses 
denying citizenship through matrilineal descent and requiring written proficiency in                                                         
13 Malagodi, (n 9). 
14 Hesselbarth, (n 12). 
15 Local Self-Governance Act 1999, s 7.  
16 ibid s 8.  
17 ibid s 172(2)(e). 
18 National Foundation for the Development of Indigenous Nationalities (NFDIN) Act 2002, sch. 
19 International Crisis Group, ‘Nepal’s Troubled Tarai Region’ (9 July 2007) Asia Report No 136, 4-5. 
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the Nepali language to acquire citizenship. These provisions were included to protect 
‘Nepali-ness’ given the heavy Indian influence in the Terai due to the open border.20 
The demand for equal citizenship has been at the core of the agenda of Madhesi rights 
activists since the 1950s. The movement found renewed strength in the 1980s and 
organised itself as an identity-based regional political party in the early 1990s. Thus, 
Madhesi demands for identity-based federalism ought to be understood in connection 
with their long-standing campaign for equal citizenship.  
The Maoists capitalised on these groups’ discontent, which stemmed from their 
economic, social and political marginalisation, and successfully tied the demand for 
federalisation with identity. Madhesi, Janajati and Dalit groups operating inside and 
outside traditional parties embraced demands for identity-based federalism. They 
demanded federal restructuring along ethnic lines to secure their inclusion and 
participation in state structures, and break the long-established Pahari upper-caste 
Hindu hegemony over the country. ‘Adamant’ federalists emphasised the importance 
of identity and history as the basis for federalisation: 
They demand that state boundaries be demarcated so that marginalised groups together 
gain a slight demographic, and possibly electoral, advantage over upper-caste Brahmin 
and Chhetri groups. In many present administrative units, the latter are dominant. 
Districts could also be divided between the new states. Speakers of some languages 
other than Nepali would be able to use their mother tongues officially in their states, 
giving Nepal’s linguistic diversity the chance to develop in the mainstream. For 
marginalised groups, federalism is also about recognition and dignity. All these 
measures would help modify the monolithic Hindu, hill upper-caste Nepali identity 
codified by the monarchy in the mid-20th century.21 
The promulgation of the Interim Constitution in January 2007 represents a watershed 
for federal demands in Nepal. The new document, while heavily based on the 1990 
Constitution, remained silent on the issue of the monarchy, devoid of most of the 
ethno-cultural references that characterised the previous document, and proclaimed 
Nepal a secular state. 22 It provided the basis for the functioning of the Constituent                                                         
20 Malagodi, (n 9) 164-68. 
21 International Crisis Group, ‘Nepal’s Constitution (I): Evolution not Revolution’ (27 August 2012) 
Asia Report No 233, 3. 
22 Mara Malagodi, ‘Constitutional Change and the Quest for Legal Inclusion in Nepal’ in Colin Harvey 
and Alexander Schwartz (eds), Rights in Divided Societies (Hart Publishing 2012), 169-93. 
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Assembly, but left a number of issues open for later political negotiation, such as 
federal restructuring. Significantly the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement was 
entirely silent on federalism. The commitment to federalisation resulted from the 
Madhesi Andolan, a mass protest movement against discrimination of Madhesi 
groups, which led to prolonged strikes and violence in January 2007. To appease the 
protestors, the Interim Government eventually accepted their demand for 
federalisation and amended the Interim Constitution accordingly. 23  The amended 
Interim Constitution, however, fell short of a federal design and Nepal remained de 
facto a unitary state.  
It was only at this point, in response to the violent protests in the Terai, that the Nepali 
Congress, UML, and other smaller conservative and left wing parties recognised 
federalisation as inevitable. They also accepted federalism to appease their Janajati, 
Madhesi and Dalit members and supporters, and avoid exacerbating political conflict. 
The debate had now shifted onto the basis of federalisation and the ‘reluctant’ 
federalists steadfastly opposed identity-based federal restructuring. They advocated 
instead for a weak form of capability-based federalism along the existing lines of 
devolution, with no reference to identity, to make each federal unit financially viable. 
Their opposition to identity-based federalism stemmed from nativist conceptions of 
the Nepali state and nationalism, a fear of loosing their power base, and an 
apprehension that a polarisation of Nepal’s highly diverse society along 
institutionalised ethnic lines may lead to Nepal’s disintegration and further conflict. 
While the spectre of secession was mostly a rhetorical threat used by the Nepali 
Congress and the UML—as well as the parties advocating a unitary state (e.g. RPP)—
many expressed genuine concerns that identity-based federalisation could lead to 
further marginalisation and violence. 
 
2.2. Nepal’s Constitution-Making Process and the Federal Question 
The first Constituent Assembly held its first meeting on 28 May 2008, and declared 
Nepal a ‘Federal Democratic Republic’. The ‘adamant’ federalists had political                                                         
23 International Crisis Group, ‘Nepal: Identity Politics and Federalism’ (13 January 2011) Asia Report 
No 199, 8.  
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momentum and a slight numerical advantage.24 Substantive debates on the nature of 
federal restructuring took place first in the Committee on State Restructuring and 
Distribution of State Power. The majority in the Committee voted for a model 
featuring 14 Provinces based on the criteria of ‘identity’ as well as ‘capability’, which 
was to ensure the viability of the Provinces; however, the names and boundaries of 
the Provinces were mostly along ethnic lines.25 The identity markers highlighted by 
the Committee were: ethnic/communal, linguistic, cultural, geographical/continuity of 
regional identities, and continuity with historical identities. 26 Preferential political 
rights (agradhikar) were in the form of temporary reservations of a share of political 
offices for the majority group in each Province. No other special entitlements were 
given to such majority ethnic groups. This model raised preoccupations about the 
position of smaller groups and was opposed by the ‘reluctant’ federalists. 
Significantly, four UML members voted for the proposal in the Committee against the 
party line, allowing it to pass. A number of Committee members, however, did not 
support the proposal. A Nepali Congress leader put forward an alternative 6 Province 
model defined solely on the basis of capability and not identity, where the federal 
units were strikingly similar to the existing Development Regions.  
After thirteen month of deliberations, the Committee’s report was completed and 
submitted for plenary discussion on 27 January 2010. The discussion in the 
Constituent Assembly was brief, but caused so much controversy that federalisation 
was set aside and added to a growing list of contentious issues’.27 The question of 
federal restructuring was then moved out of the Assembly with the creation of a nine-
member High Level State Restructuring Commission in November 2011. 
Significantly, the Commission members were not CA members, but political 
appointees deemed to have some specialised knowledge in matters of federalism. The 
elusive search for political consensus brought the deliberations on a key political issue 
outside of the Assembly. However, the Commission too proved incapable of resolving                                                         
24 The Maoists controlled almost 35% of the seats and the Madhesi parties were respectively the fourth 
and fifth biggest parties. 
25 The fourteen provinces identified by the CA1 Committee on State Restructuring and Distribution of 
State Authority were: 1) Limbuwan, 2) Mithila-Bhojpura-Koch-Madhes, 3) Kirant, 4) Sunkoshi, 5) 
Sherpa, 6) Tamsaling, 7) Newa, 8) Narayani, 9) Tamuwan, 10) Magarat, 11) Lumbini-Awadh-
Tharuwan, 12) Karnali, 13) Jadan, and 14) Khaptad. 
26  Constituent Assembly of Nepal, Report of the Committee for Restructuring the State and 
Distribution of State Power (2010). 
27 International Crisis Group, (n. 21). 
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the deadlock. The majority report put forward an 11 Province model with names 
reflecting the mixed adoption of ethnic and geographical denominators (except in the 
case of Dalits, whose Province was to be non-territorial). The minority report by three 
Commission members (NC and UML appointees) proposed a 6 Province model along 
the existing administrative structure, with the names to be decided by parliament after 
promulgation. By February 2012 the Commission submitted two separate reports to 
the Prime Minister.28 
Eventually, with the 28 May 2012 deadline looming, the top party leaders attempted a 
series of last minute agreements. On 15 May, the Nepali Congress, UML, and Maoist 
leaders agreed on an 11 Province model with provisions for naming the federal units 
at the first meeting of their respective Provincial Assemblies. Janajati and Madhesi 
groups, however, successfully pressured the Maoists to uphold their commitment to 
identity-based federalism. Thus, the Maoists backtracked from the deal on the eve of 
the Assembly’s deadline leading to its dissolution. 
The 2013 elections made the ‘reluctant’ federalists into the dominant force in the 
second Constituent Assembly. Nonetheless, little progress was made on negotiations 
over the most contentious issues until the decision to ‘fast-track’ constitutional 
drafting after the 2015 earthquakes. On 8 June 2015, the main four parties (Nepali 
Congress, UML, Maoists, and Madhesi Forum-L) reached a political settlement 
known as the 16 Point Agreement, which was to form the basis of the new 
constitution. 29 Significantly, the negotiations included only four of the thirty-one 
parties represented in the Assembly and made little effort to include representation 
from the marginalised groups. The Agreement crucially sought to postpone the 
naming and demarcation of the federal units until the promulgation of the new 
constitution and the elections of the central and provincial legislatures. The 
postponement immediately sparked protests. As a result, petitions were filed in the 
Supreme Court to have the Agreement declared violative of the currently in force 
2007 Interim Constitution. In an unprecedented move, on 19 June, a single bench of 
                                                        
28  Alliance for Social Dialogue, ‘Two Separate Reports by the State Restructuring Commission 
(January 29-February 4)’ Alliance for Social Dialogue (5 February 2012) <http://asd.org.np/political-
updates/two-separate-reports-by-the-state-restructuring-commission-january-29-february-4/>.  
29  16 Point Agreement: <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/nepal/document/papers/16-
point_Agreement.htm>. 
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the Supreme Court issued an Interim Order against the implementation of the 
Agreement’s postponement of federalisation.30  
As protests grew increasingly violent and the security forces’ response heavy handed, 
on 8 August 2015, the political leaders relented and inked a 6 Province deal on the 
basis of the existing administrative boundaries, splitting the Terai across a number of 
Provinces, and excluding identity as the basis for federalisation.31 Protests intensified 
and on 21 August the Nepali Congress, UML, and Maoists agreed on a new 7 
Province model (essentially carving Province 7 out of Province 6 and maintaining the 
controversial longitudinal division of the country), while the Madhesi Forum-L did 
not support the scheme.32 On 23 August, the draft constitution was tabled for approval 
by the Assembly as the CA members representing the marginalised groups walked out 
in protest.33 Violent demonstrations and communal violence erupted across the Terai, 
leading to the death of security forces and protestors in Kailali, the imposition of a 
curfew, and the deployment of the Nepal Army.34 Nonetheless, the new Constitution 
was promulgated on 20 September 2015 with an astounding majority in the 
Assembly. While federalism was eventually accepted, the framework adopted – 
entirely devoid of identity considerations in both naming and delimitations – reflected 
the political balance between the ‘adamant’ and ‘reluctant’ federalists.  
 
3. Constitutional Incrementalism in Nepal 
Constitutional incrementalism – an innovative approach to constitution making – aims 
to offer an alternative way of tackling disagreements over the nature of the polity in 
deeply divided societies. Lerner describes this evolutionary strategy as based on 
silences, contradictions, and deferrals in the drafting of the constitutional text in order 
to avoid forcing unequivocal choices between competing norms and identities at this 
high stake moment. Lerner also emphasises that this approach to constitution making                                                         
30 Adv.Dipendra Jha, ‘English Version of the SC order’ (Twitter.com, 19 June 
2015)<https://twitter.com/dipjha/status/612139709553229824>. 
31The Nepali Times Blog, “Federalism deal signed’ The Nepali Times (Kathmandu, 8 August 2015) 
<www.nepalitimes.com/blogs/thebrief/2015/08/08/federalism-deal-signed/>. 
32  Karma99, ‘Timeline of proposed federal structures’ (Karma99, April 2015) 
<http://www.karma99.com/2015/04/proposed-federal-structures-of-nepal.html>.  
33 Prakash Acharya, ‘CA on cusp of promulgating constitution’ The Himalayan Times (Kathmandu, 24 
August 2015) <http://thehimalayantimes.com/kathmandu/ca-on-cusp-of-promulgating-constitution/>.  
34 Human Rights Watch, ‘Like We Are Not Nepali: Protest and Police Crackdown in the Terai Region 
of Nepal’ Human Rights Watch (16 October 2015). 
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applies only to controversial foundational issues. These encompass the constitutional 
choices regarding the declaratory parts and symbolic aspects of the constitution; they 
do not include institutional decisions about the frame of government at the time of 
constitution making. 35  The advantages of adopting an incrementalist strategy in 
constitutional definitions of the polity’s collective identity are twofold: in the short 
term, to avoid overt conflict and secure the adoption of the constitution; in the long 
term, to promote political stability and democracy.  
 
Lerner further explains that an incrementalist strategy avails itself of a toolkit based 
on four principles that diverge from the common wisdom associated with 
constitution-making moments.36 This section investigates the extent to which Nepal’s 
federalisation process during the drafting of the 2015 Constitution adhered to the key 
tenets of constitutional incrementalism: (a) non-majoritarianism, (b) a non-
revolutionary approach to constitution making, (c) the representation of ‘We the 
divided people’ and (d) the transfer of decisions from the constitutional to the political 
sphere. It is argued that to some extent incrementalist strategies were deployed during 
Nepal’s post-conflict constitution-making process to address some foundational 
issues, but when it came to federalisation it proved impossible to fudge and defer. 
 
3.1. Non-Majoritarianism 
The choice of a non-majoritarian decision-making process in constitution making is 
pivotal to the incrementalist strategy because it secures the co-option of minorities 
and their buy-in into the new constitutional framework. 37  Decision-making by 
consensus at the time of constitution drafting aims at enlarging to the greatest possible 
extent the base of stakeholders upon which the new constitution relies. As such, 
constitutional incrementalism deems a consensual approach to constitution making 
more effective than majoritarianism in fostering the legitimacy and stability of the 
emerging constitutional settlement. The crucial question, however, is to determine 
whose consensus ought to be gained to secure the viability and endurance of the new 
constitution. This can only be determined by an astute analysis of the competing 
                                                        
35 Lerner, (n. 1) 39-40. 
36 Lerner, (n. 1) 41. 
37 Lerner, (n. 1) 41. 
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political interests along ideological and identitarian fault lines, and their translation 
into group affiliations in each specific case study. 
 
In Nepal, a commitment to decision-making ‘by consensus’ (sahamati) was built into 
the 2007 Interim Constitution in all the clauses related to decision-making in the 
Constituent Assembly – both in its ordinary legislative capacity and constitution-
making facet. For instance, the 5th Amendment added a subsection to Article 33 on 
the Responsibilities of the State ‘to develop a culture of resolving major political 
problems of the country with understanding, consensus, and cooperation amongst the 
major political parties’. Two issues arise: first, this section was non-justiciable; thus, 
consensus decision-making remained, legally speaking, aspirational. The Interim 
Constitution, instead, provided for voting procedures for all the Constituent 
Assembly’s decisions; most of them required a simple majority of members present in 
the House, with a quorum of one fourth of the total CA members. Only constitutional 
amendments (Article 148) and the passing of the new Constitution required a 
qualified majority of two-thirds of the total CA members (Article 70). Similarly, the 
Constituent Assembly Rules, which were enacted in November 2008, provided that 
all of the Constituent Assembly’s Committees could pass any proposal at Committee 
stage by a simple majority vote. While legally two-thirds of the CA members could 
declare the new Constitution, politically it proved unmanageable to do so without the 
support of all the main political leaders, that is, ‘by consensus’.  
 
Second, the requirement of a consensus decision-making process in constitution-
drafting matters focused on the leaders of the parliamentary parties (samsadīya dalkā 
netā) under Article 70(3). In a way, the Interim Constitution treated Nepal’s major 
political parties as monolithic and ideologically homogeneous entities. Conversely, 
the party leadership was expected to iron out any internal differences and enforce 
discipline through the use of party whips. But, in both Constituent Assemblies, 
identity-based political cleavages manifested themselves also at intra-party level in 
the three main ideology-based political parties: the Nepali Congress, UML and the 
Maoists. In fact, even if the CA Rules were silent on the issues of Caucuses, CA 
Speaker Subhash Chandra Nembang allowed for the spontaneous creation of cross-
party Caucuses along identity lines in the first Constituent Assembly. The formation 
of the Women, Janajati, Dalit, and Madhesi Caucuses demonstrated that other bonds 
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of solidarity and political cooperation existed in the Assembly beyond party 
affiliation. In fact, on numerous occasions, CA members voted according to their 
conscience, ignoring party lines. For instance, the vote against party lines of the UML 
Janajati members in the first Constituent Assembly’s Thematic Committee on State 
Restructuring allowed for the 14 Province model to pass at that stage.  
The party leaders responded by unleashing their whips on defiant party members. 
However, the use of whips in the first Constituent Assembly, not just on ordinary 
legislative matters, but also on votes on constitutional issues when rebellious 
members were subjected to a three-line-whip, effectively curbed many cross-party 
initiatives aimed at securing inclusion. This was especially significant for the defiant 
CA members elected under proportional representation, as expulsion from their 
respective parties would have resulted in the loss of their seat altogether. 38  
Significantly, quotas for marginalised groups were only adopted for CA seats 
allocated under proportional representation (335), not first-past-the-post (240), 
making the most representative seats for marginalised groups the most vulnerable to 
the use of whips.  
The leadership of the three main political parties, including the Maoists, dominated by 
upper caste Pahari Hindu males as it was, succeeded in silencing voices of dissent by 
their women, Janajati, Madhesi, and Dalit members. The suppression of demands for 
inclusion within the Constituent Assembly severely curtailed ‘systemic’ ways through 
which the discontent of marginalised groups could be channelled and accommodated. 
A 2012 report by the International Crisis Group took stock of the failure of the first 
Assembly and concluded: 
The peace process has relied extensively on a tired idea of consensus between the 
parties. Until the constitution was completed, the main parties were to agree on all 
major decisions to ensure broad buy-in. This sometimes prevented the worst-case 
scenario, but it also devalued democratic participation.39  
                                                        
38  Krishna Khanal, Frits Sollewijn Gelpke, and Uddhab Prasad Pyakurel, Dalit Representation in 
National Politics of Nepal (Nepal National Dalit Social Welfare Organisation 2012) 
<www.idsn.org/fileadmin/user_folder/pdf/New_files/Nepal/2013/Dalit_Representation_in_National_P
olitics_of_Nepal_-_2012.pdf>.  
39 International Crisis Group, (n. 21) i,  
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As a result, the Constituent Assembly was hollowed out as the primary site of 
democratic deliberation and the constitution-making task was substantially shifted to 
the leaders of the main political parties. 
 
In the second Constituent Assembly, the coalition government of the Nepali Congress 
and UML sought to prohibit the formation of cross-party Caucuses and continued the 
use of whips in votes on constitutional matters, even if the new CA Rules were silent 
on both issues. 40  A 2014 Policy Brief by Martin Chautari concludes that while 
unwritten, the ‘ban’ on Caucuses in the second Constituent Assembly was clear:  
Lessons learnt by the political elite from the first Constituent Assembly thus appear to 
be the importance of limiting inclusion, securing the privilege of the main political 
parties, enabling absenteeism, controlling democracy, and protecting political hierarchy 
in what should be the site of equal democratic deliberations for a new constitution.41  
As a result, little progress on drafting was made, and by October 2014 the ruling 
coalition hinted at the possibility of passing the new constitution ‘by process’, that is, 
by a qualified two-third majority vote in the Constituent Assembly.  
 
In response, the Maoist-led alliance of twenty-two parties threatened to reject the new 
constitution if it was not forged ‘by consensus’, and to take to the streets and launch a 
programme of protests. However, the requirement for a two-thirds majority vote to 
pass the new constitution made the two dominant parties short of a handful of votes 
and a degree of compromise was eventually forced upon them. The ‘reluctant’ 
federalists (temporarily) accepted identity as one of the basis to delimit the federal 
units and for affirmative action. However, as intra and inter-party squabbles 
continued, the new constitution could not be passed within the original deadline of 
January 2015.  
 
In the wake of the spring 2015 earthquakes, Nepal’s political elites sought to ‘fast 
track’ the drafting of the constitution by sidestepping key procedural requirements 
within the Assembly. A number of Constituent Assembly Rules were suspended,                                                         
40 Kamal Dev Bhattarai, ‘CA caucus debate rages; parties divided’ The Kathmandu Post (Kathmandu, 
8 March 2014) <www.ekantipur.com/2014/03/08/top-story/ca-caucus-debate-rages-parties-
divided/386395.html>. 
41 Martin Chautari, ‘Attendance and Process in Constituent Assembly II’ Briefing Paper No 11, Martin 
Chautari (September 2014). 
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leading, for instance, to a much shorter timeframe for CA members to revise the draft 
tabled by the Drafting Committee and for public consultations.42 As the leaders of the 
main four parties (Nepali Congress, UML, Maoists, and Madhesi Forum-L) reached 
the 16 Point Agreement, they entirely excluded from the decision-making process 
smaller parties, but also women, Madhesi, Dalit, Janajati, and religious minorities – 
both within their own parties and outside – ignoring their demands for recognition. 
Eventually, the consensus reached amongst the leadership of the biggest three 
political parties allowed for the constitution to be passed by the second Constituent 
Assembly with an 89% majority, and 532 out of the 598 CA members present voting 
in favour of the document.  
 
The new constitution and its embattled federal scheme certainly embody the 
consensus of the main political parties’ leaders and reflect the successful co-option of 
the Maoists by the political mainstream. However, the new constitutional 
arrangements did not garner the consensus of many marginalised groups who had first 
demanded identity-based federalisation as the main constitutional route to inclusion. 
Thus, the 2015 Constitution remains a contentious and unstable settlement with 
regard to federalism. It is premature to say whether the ongoing process of federal 
restructuring will resolve this impasse, or whether further constitutional amendments 
will be required to secure the buy-in of the detractors of this mode of federalisation. 
 
3.2. Non-Revolutionary Approach to Constitution-Making 
Constitutional incrementalism rejects the revolutionary understanding of constitution 
making in favour of an open-ended approach that allows for future adaptations and 
gradual resolution of potentially explosive foundational questions. In Nepal, the 
making of the 2015 Constitution by a directly elected Constituent Assembly was 
prima facie at odds with the tenets of incrementalism both in terms of process and 
scope. First, in terms of process, King Tribhuvan had initially promised a Constituent 
Assembly in 1951 – a promise that remained unfulfilled until 2008. An elected body 
had never drafted any of Nepal’s previous six constitutions. Thus, the allure of a 
Constituent Assembly process, and the expectations that it engendered, grew                                                         
42  Nepali Times, 3 July 2015, ‘Fast-track Drafting’ 
http://archive.nepalitimes.com/blogs/thebrief/2015/07/03/fast-track-drafting. 
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exponentially in that context. The modality of constitution-making through a 
Constituent Assembly raised per se enormous expectations. Andrew Arato explains 
that Constituent Assemblies are the archetype of revolutionary constituent power. 
They are conceived as sovereign institutions with unlimited powers; as such they are 
imagined to embody the unified will of the people and promise a total rupture from 
the old regime through a foundational moment.43 Certainly for the Maoists and for 
many of Nepal’s historically marginalised groups, the constitution-making process 
through a directly elected Constituent Assembly represented both the achievement of 
a very long political struggle and the opportunity to reshape their country radically. 
Second, the work of the first Constituent Assembly began under the banner of 
‘building a New Nepal’ and the mantra of social inclusion. The Constituent Assembly 
was expected to bring radical change and re-define the meaning of ‘Nepali-ness’ by 
forging a new civic sense of national belonging in which all groups and individuals 
could feel included. As such, it was conceived as a radical break from the past and a 
critical juncture in Nepal’s constitutional politics. The process of federalisation with 
an emphasis on identity was a central part of this radical programme of state 
restructuring. In this light, the new constitution was expected to settle the 
foundational questions that had started to emerge during the 2006 democracy 
movement, the 2007 Madhes Andolan, and Janajati agitation organised by NEFIN. 
Crucially, constitutional demands for secularism, federalism, republicanism, and 
affirmative action measures in state employment and political representation were 
reflected into the Interim Constitution and were simply expected to endure in the 
permanent constitution. The first Constituent Assembly effectively operated on that 
assumption, even if the main opposition parties – Nepali Congress and UML – 
consistently (and in the end successfully) resisted that trajectory to the point that the 
constitution could not be finalised. The dissolution of the first Constituent Assembly, 
the success of the centrist parties, and the debacle of the pro-federalist forces in the 
elections of the second Constituent Assembly changed the direction of Nepal’s 
constitution making, especially with regard to the constitutional re-definition of the 
nation and the role of identity in the state restructuring agenda. 
                                                        
43 Andrew Arato, Post Sovereign Constitution Making (Oxford University Press, 2016), 91, 108. 
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The work of the second Constituent Assembly began on a sombre note, in the shadow 
of the first Assembly’s failure and with the ‘reluctant’ federalists at the helm of the 
government. This meant a much more modest scope that translated into a steady 
rollback of the inclusion agenda, especially in the form of identity-based federalism. 
There was a pervasive sense that after 2012 the ‘constitutional moment’ had been 
somehow lost. 44  Tellingly, the first International Crisis Group’s report after the 
demise of the first Constituent Assembly was titled ‘Nepal’s Constitution: Evolution 
Not Revolution’. Thus, the changed political composition of the body reshaped its 
constitution-making priorities. Like in the first Assembly, federalism was slotted by 
the Constitutional Records Study and Determination Committee as one of the 
‘disputed’ issues and, in early 2014, kicked to the Constitutional Political Dialogue 
and Consensus Committee headed by Maoist leader Baburam Bhattarai.  
Virtually no progress was made on the most contentious issues for over a year and the 
‘adamant’ federalists began to fear that the ‘reluctant’ federalists were engaged in a 
form of counter-revolution by stealth through delaying tactics. The proponents of 
identity-based federalism had already made concessions to the other camp during the 
first Constituent Assembly: they had agreed to remove preferential rights and include 
other basis for federalisation alongside identity, for example ‘capability’. However, 
the apparent capitulation of the Maoists in supporting the post-earthquake agreement 
that sought to postpone federalism was the last straw for many marginalised groups: 
‘Mutual mistrust was so high in June 2015 that Madhesi, Tharu and Janajati groups 
read the postponement of the state boundaries as a ploy by traditionally dominant hill-
origin Brahmin and Chhetri leaders to slide federalism off the table’.45  
On 30 June 2015, the Constitution Drafting Committee released the first draft of the 
Constitution. The document ignored the Supreme Court decision forbidding the 
postponement of federalisation and ordering the Constituent Assembly to delineate 
the federal boundaries. In fact, Article 60 of the draft made provisions for the Federal 
Parliament to decide with a two-thirds majority vote the names and boundaries of the 
federal units on the basis of the report by an ad hoc Commission. Controversially the 
draft also presented an 8 Province model, which did not reflect any of the proposals                                                         
44 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Harvard University Press 1991). 
45 International Crisis Group, ‘Nepal’s Divisive New Constitution: An Existential Crisis’ (4 April 
2016) Asia Report No 276, 7. 
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previously discussed. Moreover, the draft backtracked on proportional representation, 
reintroduced gender-based discrimination in matters of citizenship, and created the 
controversial category Khas-Arya as a group entitled to affirmative action measures. 
Tensions ran high across the country, but particularly in the Terai.  
Negotiations continued and changes made to the draft. When in August 2015 the map 
of the proposed 6 Province model was released to the public, violent protests by 
Madhesi and Tharu groups erupted. The protests were met with a heavy-handed 
response by security forces, which further exacerbated a tense situation. 46  The 
protests continued for months alongside an unofficial blockade of the border with 
India. The attempts to put pressure on the Nepal Government to review the 
constitutional arrangements backfired, leading to intransigence in Kathmandu. 
Ultimately the only way to change the territorial demarcation of the federal units 
under the 2015 Constitution will be to amend the document. Given the complex 
procedural requirements and the lack of appetite for reform from the main parties it 
seems unlikely in the immediate future, leaving little room for systemic, evolutionary 
ways of revisiting federalisation under the 2015 constitutional settlement.  
 
3.3. Representation of Ideological Disagreement 
The accommodation of conflicting views about the nature of the polity is at the heart 
of constitutional incrementalism. Thus, the incrementalist approach to constitution 
making expressly recognises a country’s deep identitarian cleavages in the 
foundational aspects of its constitution. Competing ideas about the state are 
represented in the guise of ‘We the divided people’ by including vague and even 
contradictory constitutional provisions that define the collective identity of the 
polity.47 This is perhaps where Nepal’s 2015 Constitution comes closer to displaying 
an incrementalist approach in the drafting of the constitution’s declaratory parts.  
With regard to federalisation, the designation of the Provinces with numbers from 1 to 
7 under the 2015 Constitution can be construed as an example of incrementalism only 
to a limited extent. While the 2015 Constitution rejected the politics of defining and 
                                                        
46 Human Rights Watch (n. 34). 
47 Lerner, (n. 1) 43-44. 
 21 
entrenching provincial identities by using historical ethno-cultural markers and 
instead simply assigned a number to each of them, it made no provisions for any 
future renaming of the Provinces under Article 56 and Schedule 4. Cultural identity 
was taken out of the constitutional equation in matters of federalisation, but not 
deferred. The issue now appears settled and closed off to any intervention short of a 
constitutional amendment. In fact, during the life of the first Assembly innumerable 
discussions over the names of the federal units had taken place to no avail. The 
‘politics of naming’ became inextricably intertwined with discussions over the basis 
to delimit the boundaries of the Provinces, that is, to what extent identity and history 
could be criteria for federalisation from a territorial perspective.  
The role of identity in federalisation also raised the issue of the relationships amongst 
the different groups within each federal unit. The difficulty of this debate was 
exacerbated by the proposals to include preferential rights for the majority ethno-
linguistic groups in each Province. The proposal was already dropped during the first 
Constituent Assembly, but the moral panic and backlash it engendered are a clear 
indication of the widespread opposition to identity-based federalism in the country. 
As such, the foundational question of naming the Provinces acquired central stage in 
Nepal’s federal debates, eclipsing more substantive questions about federalising the 
frame of government.  
The main objection to identity-based federalism stemmed from the fear that Nepal 
would become ‘balkanised’. It was repeatedly argued that the explicit recognition of 
identity as the basis for federalisation would ultimately threaten national unity and 
lead to the fragmentation of the state. In this is regard, it is important to underscore 
that the drafting of the 2015 Constitution took place in the wake of the earthquakes 
and in the midst of the unofficial Indian blockade. In this vulnerable context 
nationalist sentiments ran high and the plea for national unity found fertile ground 
among the majority of the country’s political forces. Eventually, Nepali politicians 
from across the spectrum closed ranks, found their way to a set of agreements, and 
produced a constitution within a few months. A sign of this defensiveness is clearly 
evident in the total absence of official records of the constitution-making process in 
the second CA. Committee reports were not made publicly available (they still are 
not) and the debates of the CA were not recorded. However, the lack of transparency 
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in the constitution-making process significantly weakened the legitimacy of the new 
Constitution, especially given how embattled it remains. The protests in the Terai 
eventually made federalisation inevitable, but identity as a basis for state restructuring 
was obliterated by the perceived threats to Nepal’s territorial integrity.  
The newfound emphasis on national unity, however, translated also into the manner in 
which the 2015 Constitution approached broader foundational issues. The 
constellation of provisions that define the identity of the Nepali polity in the 
constitution’s declaratory parts represents the clearest example of constitutional 
incrementalism in this case study. The ideological tensions in the re-definition of 
Nepal’s national identity are encapsulated in a set of contradictory positions that 
simultaneously backtrack from the more neutral Interim Constitution and incorporate 
aspects of ‘constitutional nationalism’ that were prevalent under the 1990 
Constitution.  
Nepal is defined as a ‘multi-religious’ nation (Article 3), but secularism is limited to 
‘the protection of religion since sanātana’, that is, a particularly conservative version 
of Hinduism (Article 4), and national emblems are steeped in Hindu symbolism with 
the cow as the national animal and saffron as the national colour (Article 9). On more 
substantive matters, which nonetheless pertain to the legal entitlements that stem from 
belonging to the Nepali nation or not, the 2015 Constitution guarantees freedom of 
religion, but continues to include a ban on conversion (Article 26). Women’s rights 
are expressly included in the Constitution (Article 38) and no discrimination on the 
basis of gender is permitted (Article 18), but the section on Citizenship directly 
discriminates against Nepali women married to foreign citizens or those who have 
had children with foreign men (Article 11). Affirmative action measures for 
historically marginalised groups are found throughout the 2015 Constitution, but the 
new controversial Khas-Arya category was included in the list of beneficiaries 
(Articles 18, 42, 84, 176, 259, 267) nominally as a way of addressing the issue of the 
‘creamy layer’ and uplift poor upper caste Pahari Hindus, but substantively to appease 
the dominant groups. 
It is in light of this re-creation of a ‘hierarchy of belonging’ to the Nepali nation by 
the new Constitution that the dissatisfaction with federalisation by a number of 
marginalised groups ought to be understood. While ‘historical identities’ were 
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obliterated in the process of federalisation ostensibly to prevent ‘balkanisation’, they 
found a place in the definition of the nation. But the national identity promoted by the 
new constitution reflected long-standing ethno-cultural majoritarian nationalist 
narratives forged during the Panchayat era and constitutionalised ever since – with the 
notable exception of the 2007 Interim Constitution, which was more inclusive on 
foundational issues. Unlike the case studies selected in Lerner’s book, which are all 
constitution-making experiences in newly created states, Nepal’s 2015 Constitution 
was the seventh in the country’s history and backtracked from a previous, more 
inclusionary constitutional settlement. Nationalist narratives in the new constitution, 
however, have been tempered by far-reaching references to multiculturalism in the 
declaratory parts of the document and an extensive section on fundamental rights – 
although many of them subject to ordinary legislative intervention.48  
The question that remains is whether the foundational vagueness, contradictions, and 
inconsistencies in the 2015 Constitution will prove a useful tool to defuse tensions 
and create a common denominator. Only time will tell: the way in which Nepali 
politicians will choose to implement the constitution, and Nepali judges interpret it, 
will determine its stability. 
 
3.4. Transferring Problems from the Constitutional to the Political Arena 
Constitutional incrementalism deals with intractable foundational issues by deferring 
them in time and space. In other words, the most problematic constitution-making 
choices are postponed, removed from the constitutional arena, and put in the hands of 
politicians to solve them at a later stage through ordinary legislation.49 In Nepal there 
were two failed attempts at deploying this strategy – at the eleventh hour of the first 
Constituent Assembly in May 2012 and with the signing of the 16 Point Agreement in 
June 2015. The obvious source of inspiration for postponing the controversial naming 
and demarcation of the federal units in Nepal came from the successful linguistic 
reorganisation of the Indian States in 1956 – six years after the post-independence 
Constitution came into force. 50  But there was a crucial difference: British India                                                         
48 Dixon and Ginsburg, (n. 8). 
49 Lerner, (n. 1) 44-46. 
50 Lerner, (n. 1) 147. 
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already featured a federal structure during colonial times and federalism per se was 
not a controversial issue within the Constituent Assembly.51 Moreover, delaying the 
reorganisation of States on the basis of linguistic identity in India did not equate to 
postponing federalism. In Nepal, instead, had the new constitution deferred the 
demarcation of federal units, Nepal would have continued to function as a unitary 
state until the Provinces were created. In India’s Constituent Assembly the 
relationship between linguistic identity and federal units was purely foundational, in 
Nepal instead it mixed foundational questions with frame of government issues. As a 
result, in Nepal a purely incrementalist strategy of temporal deferral to the political 
arena was rejected in matters of federalisation. 
Nepal, instead, adopted a seemingly incrementalist strategy with regard to the 
constitution-making process throughout the work of the two Constituent Assemblies 
by transferring key decisions from the constitutional to the political arena. The most 
contentious constitution-making decisions (federal restructuring, presidential versus 
parliamentary government, and the judiciary) were soon removed from the 
Constituent Assembly and put in the hands of the main political parties’ leadership 
outside the CA. But these decisions were not deferred; they were made 
contemporaneously to the life of the constitution-making body. Immediately after the 
first Constituent Assembly’s Committees submitted their reports and they were 
unsuccessfully debated in the plenary, the task of resolving controversial issues was 
removed from the CA. The process was removed from the open public debate of the 
body directly representative of the Nepali people, which had been created specifically 
to write Nepal’s new constitution. It was, instead, entrusted to the leaders’ old guard 
who operated outside the CA, therefore without the procedural guidelines and 
safeguards established to carry out the constitution-making task in a transparent, 
deliberative, and inclusive manner.  
These mostly upper-caste Pahari Hindu men negotiated crucial decisions about 
Nepal’s new constitutional settlement through the High Level Political Committee 
(HLPC) set up by then Prime Minister G.P. Koirala in January 2010. Even if the 
parties’ leaders were CA members they did not operate as constitution-makers in the 
HLPC on the basis of the CA’s ‘rules of engagement’. The distinction between the                                                         
51 Benjamin Schoenfeld, ‘Federalism in India’ (1959) 20:1 The Indian Journal of Political Science, 52-
62. 
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constitutional and political arenas in this context is to be understood on the basis of 
the fact that the Interim Constitution mandated that the CA was the only body 
empowered to draft the constitution. The net result was that no inclusive and 
transparent deliberations within the Constituent Assembly were allowed to 
accommodate different points of view on both foundational and structural issues. 
Ultimately, the modus operandi of backdoor secret negotiations and opaque deals 
outside of the Assembly undermined the legitimacy of the constitution-making 
process itself and its inclusionary credentials because the Constituent Assembly was 
the only body in which marginalised groups were directly represented. At the same 
time, the political leaders failed to forge a compromise solution, notwithstanding 
further extensions of the first Assembly’s term, and the body was eventually 
dissolved.  
Since 2013, the change at the helm of the government and in the balance of the 
political forces within the second Constituent Assembly further enhanced the strategy 
of transferring key decisions from the CA to the political leadership outside the CA. 
The earthquakes, the protests in the Terai, and the Indian blockade gave renewed 
urgency to constitution drafting, and this strategy sacrificed inclusion and legitimacy 
for speed and contingent political gains. Given how controversial certain aspects of 
the 2015 Constitution have been – first and foremost the modalities of federalisation – 
the lack of inclusion and transparency in the constitution-making process curtailed the 
buy-in of stakeholders from marginalised groups, and ultimately became detrimental 
to the legitimacy of the constitutional settlement that was eventually achieved. This 
outcome is clearly the exact opposite of what constitutional incrementalism purports 
to achieve in the long term, even if in the short term a constitution was produced.  
 
4. Conclusions 
The article has analysed the process of federalisation during the drafting of Nepal’s 
2015 Constitution and it has engaged with two questions. First, it sought to explain 
why the incrementalist approach was rejected in the course of Nepal’s most recent 
constitution-making endeavour. It is argued that the rejection of constitutional 
incrementalism in Nepal’s process of federalisation can be explained primarily by the 
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nature of federal demands and the balance of power between ‘adamant’ and 
‘reluctant’ federalists. On the one hand, Nepal’s ‘adamant’ federalists demanded an 
identity-based form of federalism designed to redress their historical marginalisation 
and to break the dominant groups’ hold on state power. On the other hand, ‘reluctant’ 
federalists had accepted a form of federalisation based on ‘capability’, strikingly 
similar to the existing territorial administrative organisation, and devoid of identity. 
Since the proposal for an incrementalist approach to federalisation ultimately came 
from the ‘reluctant’ federalists, the ‘adamant’ federalists interpreted it as an attempt to 
avoid federalisation altogether – a form of counter-revolution by stealth. This 
sentiment became particularly acute in the context of the second Constituent 
Assembly, where ‘reluctant’ federalists controlled almost two-thirds of the seats and 
had cogent justifications – post-earthquake reconstruction and the Indian blockade – 
to fast-track constitution drafting. Under those conditions, delaying federalisation 
became equated with relinquishing federalism tout court. Moreover, Nepal’s post-
conflict constitution-making process was initially expected to be a constitutional 
moment that would produce the country’s ‘definitive’ constitution – the seventh in its 
troubled history. The open-endedness of constitutional incrementalism was ill suited 
for federalisation under these political circumstances and its rejection avoided an 
exacerbation of political violence.  
Second, the article sought to reflect on the conditions under which constitutional 
incrementalism may succeed or fail. In Nepal, the demands for federalisation 
straddled constitutional questions of frame of government (the creation of federal 
units ex novo and their territorial delimitation) and foundational aspects (the naming 
of federal units). Thus, when questions of constitutional design address both structural 
and foundational aspects of constitution making, it is difficult to deploy the 
incrementalist toolkit because it is impossible to fudge, avoid, be ambiguous, or silent 
on matters pertaining to the structure of the state. Moreover, in Nepal, the transfer of 
constitutional decisions to the political sphere took place when the Constituent 
Assembly was still in place – not afterwards. This led to a progressive de-legitimation 
of the constitution-making process as a whole. Thus, in terms of comparative lessons, 
the sequencing of constitution-making decisions is paramount. For an incrementalist 
strategy to succeed in both its short term goals of producing a constitution and 
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avoiding further conflict and in its medium to long term goals of fostering political 
stability and democracy, the appropriate timing for shifting thorny constitutional 
issues to the political sphere is when the constitution-making process is concluded – 
not during. This point is especially important in the context of a Constituent 
Assembly, which as the highest form of constituent power conjures a powerful image 
of the sovereign people and engenders dramatic expectations of radical change. This 
sequencing secures the legitimacy of the constitution-making process, and of the new 
constitution.  
Finally, non-majoritarianism and consensus decision making in deeply divided 
societies ought to be construed around the broader principle of social, political, and 
economic inclusion, not solely around the inclusion of the existing political parties. 
This is crucial when identitarian cleavages are also intra-party, and the party 
leadership is dominated by hegemonic groups. For constitutional incrementalism to 
succeed all stakeholders ought to have a seat at the table, and postponement, 
vagueness, and silence must not equate to political defeat for minorities and 
historically marginalised groups. In this respect, ‘adamant’ federalists in Nepal 
understood well the potential risk of adopting an incrementalist strategy that Lerner 
has termed ‘over-rigidity’.52 Had federalisation been postponed in Nepal, material 
constitutional arrangements surrounding the territorial organisation of state power 
would have likely emerged, acquired a degree of path-dependency, and become 
paradoxically harder to change. Ultimately many historically marginalised groups 
feared that the deferral of federalisation would have translated into a ‘Waiting for 
Godot’ scenario for inclusion through federalisation, while ethno-cultural forms of 
majoritarian nationalism in the declaratory parts of the new constitution further 
entrenched the hegemony of dominant groups.  
                                                        
52 Lerner, (n. 1) 210-211. 
